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IN T'HE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
DARRELL DEVERE POULSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9656 
BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant has appealed from a conviction of mur-
der in the first degree upon jury trial in the Fourth 
Judicial District, Utah County. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was convicted of murder in the first 
degree, and the jury, which heard the case, made no 
recommendation for mercy. The appellant was, there-
fore, sentenced to death. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State contends the appellant's conviction should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State submits the following statement of facts in 
supplement to those offered by the appellant. 
On Saturday, September 16, 1961, the appellant, 
Darrell DeVere Poulson, left Provo, Utah, and drove to 
American Fork, Utah. He parked his automobile near 
the apartment of Darlo Sawyer. He approached the 
apartment, which was within a cluster of apartments, in 
one of which Karen Mechling lived (R. 190-192, Exhibit 
1). He knew the place he was looking for, because he 
had resided there before (Exhibit 5). He ''window 
peeked" at the apartment of Mr. Sawyer where Karen 
Mechling was baby tending. He noticed the girl, who 
was eleven years old (Exhibit 20), was asleep in a chair. 
He tried the door, found it unlocked, then went back 
about one-half block to the home of Harry Loader, where 
he took a caulking gun. He returned to the Sawyer home 
and quietly entered. He struck Karen Mechling in the 
head with the caulking gun two or more times (Exhibit 
5). He then carried the girl outside in the weeds behind 
the home, where he raped her. Poulson later recalled 
that she groaned during the rape and he used his fingers 
to widen her vagina so that he could insert his penis 
(Exhibit 5). During the rape, the child's vagina was 
torn from high in the vaginal vault to the anus (R. 233). 
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Karen Mechling died within four to five minutes from 
the time the appellant struck her, and she died from the 
blows to the head (R. 234-237). Semen was found in the 
girl's vaginal vault by the examining pathologist (R. 
237). After the crime, appellant went to the home of his 
mother-in-law, took money from his wife's purse, changed 
his clothes ''so no one would see the blood'' on him, and 
left for Las Vegas (Exhibit 5). He was picked up in Las 
Vegas, at the request of the Utah County Sheriff, for 
another assault that was attempted hy the appellant on 
another girl the same day as that upon Karen Mechling. 
During the latter incident, he was scared off when some-
one "hollered" at him (R. 294). Upon being brought 
back from Las Vegas, he confessed, almost spontaneuosly, 
to the killing of Karen Mechling (R. 247, 248). The appel-
lant did not endeavor to place -in.issue any other theory or 
raise a lesser included offense. This is evidenced from 
the defense counsel's statement to the court (R. 283) : 
''Of course the offense is first degree· murder no 
matter . . . in the instructions.'' 
The evidence before the jury, going to the appel-
lant's mental condition, shows the following: The appel-
lant attended public schools up to the eighth grade (Ex-
hibit 21). He had a reasonably good attendance rate, but 
his school marks were generally low, except in healtli 
and physical education. His I.Q. level for this period, 
however, showed a tendency to rise (Exhibit 21). A 
teacher evaluation of the appellant made in the sixth 
grade showed he displayed poor intellectual behavior, 
but good aesthetic behavior, and that he was generally 
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obedient and reverent (Exhibit 23). The appellant was 
thereafter transferred to the Utah State Training School 
at American Fork, Utah, after engaging in general crim-
inal misconduct finalizing in an attack on his half-sister 
in 1955 (Exhibit 24). He was discharged from the school 
in 1958 (Exhibit 28). During his stay at the American 
Fork School, he was allowed to visit at home on holidays 
and weekends. He was also allowed away from the school 
for extended visits with his mother (Exhibit 28). The 
testimony also reflected that many persons who attend 
the American Fork School are able to lead useful social 
lives in their communities (R. 341-342). Counsel for 
appellant admitted that the attendance of appellant at 
the State school was of little importance (R. 372). The 
school psychologist concluded that the appellant was 
"mentally deficient" (R. 354). He was also classified as 
being one of the most ''competent'' children at the school, 
and was no trouble at the institution (R. 342). 
The appellant's mother testified that the incident 
came as a ''shock'' and a surprise and that she would 
not have expected it (R. 350-351). 
The strongest testimony for the appellant came from 
Dr. Ija Korner, a psychologist, who examined the appel-
lant on one occasion for 21j2 hours, during which time 
he gave the appellant a few psychological tests (R. 362, 
367, 375). He did not giYe the appellant a "complete" 
I. Q. test but on the ''oral'' part of the \V echsler Bellvue 
Test, the psychologist appraised the appellant's I. Q. 
level at 67, which he said would be classified as "feeble 
minded" (R. 364). He felt that intellectually speaking, 
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appellant had "nothing on the ball." ( R. 364). He 
further felt that appellant was suffering from ''mental 
illness'' (R. 368). He defined such mental illness as where 
an individual was unable to control his impulses (R. 
395). He further indicated that he did not attempt to 
ascertain whether appellant knew the difference between 
right and wrong (R. 395-396). He characterized appel-
lant's illness as a limited capacity to control or stem his 
emotions (R. 368). He indicated that once "launched on 
an impulse," appellant has no means to prevent the act 
from being completed. Dr. Korner further indicated that 
appellant's I. Q. could vary up to seven points. He testi-
fied that his opinion was not based upon a knowledge of 
the particular facts of the case (R. 391). On cross-exami-
nation and in response to a hypothetical question posed 
by the district attorney, Dr. Korner testified that it would 
be ''possible'' that appellant acted under an impulse 
over which he had no control (R. 393), but he could not 
say at what stage the control would be lost (R. 397). No 
questions relating to the appellant's intent were asked 
Dr. Korner, and the only question that might have 
weighed on the matter was without answer (R. 396): 
'' Q. If he went into a room and hit a girl on the 
head with an instrument such as this, (indicating) 
from your examination would you be able to deter-
mine whether he knew what he was doing? 
''A. Nobody can. 
''Q. No one, you say? 
''A. No one can. Only he and, I think, his 
Maker.'' 
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A psychologist at the Utah State Hospital testified 
that he interviewed the appellant on two occasions to 
determine his I. Q. and personality integration. He gave 
appellant a complete Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 
a complete draw a person, a complete Rorschach and a 
complete Thematic Apperception Test (R. 410). He de-
termined that the appellant had a score of 73 on the 
verbal I. Q. test, 94 on the performance test, and a full 
scale I. Q. of 81. From this, he concluded that the appel-
lant had a "mild mental deficiency." (R. 412-413) He 
also felt that the I. Q. test could vary from 5 to 7 points 
(R. 414). 
A psychiatrist at the State Hospital, Dr. Carl Kivler, 
testified that he had been appointed to examine the appel-
lant by the court. He saw the appellant on the 8th, lOth, 
17th, 22nd and 29th of November, 1961, at which times 
he made a psychiatric evaluation of the appellant. He 
characterized the appellant's mental capabilities as being 
"mentally retarded in a degree as mild." (R. 421) He 
further testified that he felt appellant knew the differ-
ence between right and wrong at the time of trial and at 
the time of the crime (R. 423). He also \Yas of the opinion 
that Poulson knew the nature and quality of his acts (R. 
424). The doctor found no evidence of psychosis and 
further discussed the facts of the case with the appellant 
in some detail (R. 424). He was of the opinion that the 
accused was a hle to control his emotions and was so 
capable at the time of the crime (R. 425). 
Dr. Louis G. Moench, a psychiatrist, was also called 
as a witness and testified (R. 433). He testified that upon 
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examination of the appellant, he concluded that appel-
lant was mentally deficient, and characterized it as a 
"mild mental retardation." ( R. 435) The doctor found 
no psychosis and felt that appellant knew the difference 
between right and wrong, would understand the serious-
ness and gravity of the charges against him, the nature 
and the seriousness of the consequences of his action, and 
could control his impulses (R. 437, 438). 
Additionally, the record reflects that the appellant 
was married and attending school at the time of the crime. 
Additional facts, as they relate to specific legal argu-
ments, will be presented under the argument portion of 
this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
THE APPELLANT CAN CLAIM NO ERROR 
BECAUSE OF A FAILURE OF THE TRIAL 
JUDGE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT 
THE MENTAL ~CONDITION OF THE AP-
PELLANT COULD BE CONSIDERED IN DE-
TERMINING HIS CAP A CITY TO INTEND AS 
AN ELEMENT IN BURGLARY, SINCE: 
A. THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED AT 
TRIAL NOR DID THE APPELLANT PRE-
SENT SUCH A THEORY IN DEFENSE, 
NOR REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON SUCH 
A THEORY, AND HAS, THEREFORE, 
WAIVED ANY SUCH ISSUE. 
B. THE LEGAL THEORY OF PARTIAL 
IMPAIRMENT IS NOT PROPER BECAUSE 
THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO RAPE 
MADE IRRELEVANT SUCH A THEORY. 
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C. THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE PRESENTED OF APPELLANT'S 
IMP AIRED INTENT AT THE TIME OF 
THE OFFENSE AS WOULD REQUIRE 
THE COURT TO INSTRUCT ON THAT 
ISSUE. 
D. THE DOCTRINE OF "PARTIAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY" IS NOT COMPATIBLE 
WITH PSYCHIATRIC REALITIES NOR 
THE LEGAL TESTS OF INSANITY AND 
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN CASES OF 
THIS NATURE. 
* * * * * 
A. THE ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED AT 
TRIAL, NOR DID T'HE APPELLANT PRE-
SENT SUCH A THEORY IN DEFENSE, NOR 
REQUEST INSTRUCTIONS ON SUCH A 
THEORY, AND HAS, THEREFORE, WAIVED 
SUCH- ISSUE. 
In the instant case, the appellant contends for the 
first time, on appeal, that the trial court should have 
instructed the jury that appellant's mental condition 
might have been considered in determining whether or 
not the appellant had the requisite intent for the crime of 
burglary; and if he had no such intent, the jury should 
have been instructed to return a finding of second degree 
murder. The trial court instructed the jury on the ele-
ments of first degree murder upon the theory of a killing 
committed during the course of rape or burglary. Appel-
lant's contention is that if the specific intent required for 
burglary could not be formed b~T appellant, the jury could 
have found the killing was not committed during the com-
mission of burglary and, thus, a finding of second deg1~ee 
murder would be required. 
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The State submits the issue was never raised before 
the lower court, and that since appellant did not advance 
such a contention before the trial court, he may not raise 
the issue for the first time on appeal. The record dis-
closes that appellant's counsel at trial adopted an all or 
nothing position. Thus, counsel stated (R. 283) : 
''Of course the offense is first degree murder no 
matter ... in the instructions.'' 
No questions were asked by appellant, either of his 
own witnesses or those of the State, which related to 
whether the appellant could entertain the requisite intent 
to commit the crime of burglary. No instructions were 
requested from the court specifically calling the jury's 
attention to the weight of mental evidence on the intent 
element of burglary. The appellant cannot now for the 
first time contend that the trial court should have sua 
sponte instructed on an issue which was not raised nor 
any instructions requested thereon. It is stated in 41 
C.J.S. Homicide, Sec. 414: 
''The rule applicable in criminal cases gener-
ally, as discussed in Criminal Law §§ 1669-1700, 
that questions cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal, together with the various subsidiary 
and detailed rules as to the necessity, as a condi-
tion precedent to the review of a particular mat-
ter, of first calling it to the attention of the trial 
court in some way as by motion, objection, or 
request for an instruction, and of excepting to the 
ruling of the trial court thereon and of assigning 
the alleged error as a ground of a motion for a new 
trial, is generally applied in homicide cases ; and 
if error is not properly objected to in the lower 
court it is waived." 
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Certainly, the defendant has the duty, where he relies 
upon an affirmative fact of exoneration, to prove that fact 
and raise that issue. People v. Tidwell, 4 U. 506, 12 P. 
61 (1886). The failure of defendant to carry this burden 
in a homicide case precludes his claim of error. People v. 
Rodriquez, 182 Cal. 197, 187 P. 423; People v. McCurdy, 
140 Cal. App. 499, 35 P. 2d 569; Lee v. State, 27 Ariz. 52, 
229 P. 939. 
In State v. Thompson, 110 U. 113, 170 P. 2d 153 
( 1946), this court expressly spoke against giving to a 
jury an instruction where no issue or evidence has been 
placed before them. The court stated: 
"* * * We have repeatedly criticized the giving 
of abstract statements of the law to the jury, and 
held that it is the duty of the court to apply the law 
to the facts supported by the evidence and to not 
instruct on any question which is not involved in 
the case under the evidence.'' 
Certainly, where defense counsel has expressly stated 
that no issue of degrees of murder is involved, offered 
no instructions, took no exception to the failure to give 
an appropriate instruction, did not argue such a theory, 
and did not pattern his evidence so it would fairly raise 
the issue, the court has no duty to instruct the jury be-
yond stating the elements of the major offense. To com-
pel such an instruction would place the trial judge in a 
dilemma, since he would have the admonition in the 
Thompson case to the contrary; and if he did instruct, a 
defendant, in a similar position as appellant, could con-
tend that such action could cause a compromise verdict 
10 
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to a lesser offense, whereas, otherwise, the jury may be 
disposed to acquit, and thereby raise an issue of error. 
The trial court, in this case, did instruct the jury that 
a ''specific intent'' was needed in the crime of burglary 
(R. 443). Further, the jury was instructed that there had 
to be a union of act and intent (R. 448). If any additional 
specific instruction were needed, it was certainly incum-
bent upon the appellant to request it at trial. Sta.te v. 
Cobo, 90 U. 89, 60 P. 2d 952 (1936). His failure to do so 
must be deemed a waiver of any claim on appeal. 
It is submitted that an additional reason indicates 
that the appellant consciously did not raise the issue of 
mental impairment as it relates to specific intent. The 
appellant requested an instruction from the court on the 
so-called Durham test. Durham v. United States, 214 F. 
2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). It has been held by the Circuit 
Court for the District of Columbia that the partial re-
sponsibility test is not applicable in the face of the Dur-
has test. Stewart v. United Sta.tes, 94 App. D.C. 293, 214 
F. 2d 879 (1954); Stewart v. United Sta,tes, 275 F. 2d 617 
(D. C. Cir. 1960). 1 It would, therefore, have been incon-
sistent with the position assumed by the appellant had the 
court so instructed. See JJ!fark v. State, 236 Ind. 455, 141 
N.E. 126 (1957) for recognizing the failure to raise a de-
fense of mental abnormality on the basis of trial strategy. 
It is submitted, therefore, that there was a waiver of 
any claim to an instruction on reduced responsibility. 
1 The court speaks of "diminished responsibility" but confuses "partial 
responsibility" with the concept. See Williams, Criminal Law, 2nd Ed., Gen. 
Part., Sections 172, 173. 
11 
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B. THE LEGAL THEORY OF PARTIAL 
IMPAIRMENT IS NOT PROPER BECAUSE 
THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO RAPE MADE 
IRRELEVANT SUCH A T'HEORY. 
The theory upon which the instant case was sub-
mitted to the jury was upon the felony murder rule. The 
felony murder statute encompasses both a killing com-
mitted during commission of the crime of rape and that 
committed during burglary. Section 76-30-3, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. Burglary may involve entering a build-
ing in the night time to commit rape. Section 76-9-2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953. When the rape is actually con-
summated, two crimes have been committed, burglary 
and rape. 
Rape does not require a specific intent, but rather 
only requires a general intent to commit the act. Thus, 
in Walden v. Sta.te, 178 Tenn. 71, 156 S.W. 2d 305 (1941), 
the Tennessee Supreme Court stated the general rule: 
"In the crime of rape, no intent is requisite other 
than that evidenced by the doing of the acts con-
stituting the offense [citing authorities]." 
The court therein held intoxication to be no defense to 
a rape charge. This is supported by substantial authority. 
McGuinn. v. Un.ited States, 191 F. 2d 477; Smith v. State, 
38 So. 2d 347 (Ala.); Sta.te v. Michel, 225 La. 1040, 74 So. 
2d 158; 44 Am. Jur., Rape, Sec. 40. In Sta.te v. Mays, 225 
N. C. 486, 35 S.E. 2d 494 (1945), the defendant was 
charged with murder under the felony murder rule. The 
defendant contended that his mental deficiencies should 
be considered as to his capacity to deliberate or premedi-
12 
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tate. The court noted that where a murder is committed 
in the course of rape, the mental issue short of insanity 
has no weight. The court stated : 
"In this connection, we may note that the mental 
capacity of the defendant to deliberate and pre-
meditate is not at issue. If he possessed sufficient 
sanity to enable him to commit the crime rape then 
he is legally responsible for the homicide that 
resulted. ' ' 
See also Commonwealth v. Prenni, 357 Pa. 572, 55 A. 
2d 532. 
It is submitted that when the intent to commit rape 
would be the element of burglary involved, and when 
the rape was in fact consummated, and an unlawful kill-
ing committed incident to rape, the intent aspect in bur-
glary becomes secondary to the rape and specific intent 
is, therefore, immaterial. 
If the homicide is committed during the res gestae 
course of rape, or incidental to the commission of rape, the 
felony murder rule is applicable. MacAvory v. State. 144 
Neb. 827, 15 N.W. 2d 45 (1944); Commonwealth v. Bolish, 
381 Pa. 500, 133 R. 2d 464. The evidence in the instant 
case clearly shows the commission of rape. Extensive 
vaginal damage and the presence of semen was noted by 
the pathologist, and the appellant's statement to the 
sheriff indicated he approached the deceased child with 
the thought of rape, and did in fact commit rape upon 
her. The appellant by his statement makes clear he was 
aware of his actions since he had to use his fingers to 
effect penetration. The fact that the appellant took 
13 
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flight to escape also supports such a conclusion. This was 
corroborated by the psychiatrists who examined the 
appellant, since they testified to similar statements from 
the appellant. Based on this evidence, it is clear that 
the court, in instructing on burglary, granted the appel-
lant a more favorable position than was necessary. It 
is submitted that when uncontroverted evidence of rape is 
shown, no issue of partial responsibility is involved since 
no issue of specific intent is involved. To so construe 
otherwise would place the jury in unnecessary confusion. 
C. THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVI-
DENCE PRESENTED OF APPELLANT'S IM-
p AIRED INTENT AT THE TIME OF THE 
OFFENSE AS WOULD REQUIRE THE 
COURT TO INSTRUCT ON THAT ISSUE. 
The appellant presented no evidence to the court 
that would be sufficient to justify an instruction on the 
issue of an impaired ability to intend. Not one ques-
tion was asked of any of the psychiatric or psychologi-
cal experts who testified as to whether the appellant 
could harbor the specific intent to commit rape upon 
entering the apartment where l{aren 11echling was baby 
sitting. The only evidence introduced that could even 
hear on the matter was that of Dr. Ija Korner, whose 
opinion was that the appellant had an impaired ability 
to control his impulses (R. 364). This conclusion was 
based on the results of psychological tests.2 Dr. Korner 
testified specifically that he did not look to determine 
whether the appellant understood the ''consequences of 
2 Dr. Korner stressed that he was functioning as a psychologist and was 
limiting his opinion to the results achieved from testing (R. 367, 383, 390, 
392, 396, 401-402). 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
his acts," because it was not "part of my job." (R. 396) 
The only question asked of appellant's key defense wit-
ness as to appellant's comprehension of his act at the 
time, which would relate to his intent, was answered with 
a conclusion that no one except the appellant and his 
''Maker'' could tell. Finally, in response to a hypotheti-
cal question, Dr. l(orner said it was ''possible'' appellant 
could not control his actions. This conclusion would be 
insufficient to establish medical causation in a civil trial. 
Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 104 U. 436, 140 
P. 2d 844 (1943); Chief Consolidated Mng. Co. v. Salis-
bury, 61 U. 66, 210 P. 929 (1922). The psychiatric testi-
mony was that the accused was only mildly mentally de-
ficient, and the appellant's background and childhood 
did not indicate a total inability to comprehend. 
It is submitted that the above-mentioned evidence 
was not sufficient to require the court to instruct on the 
issue of partial responsibility. In State v. Van Vlack, 57 
Ida. 316, 65 P. 2d 736 (1937), the Idaho Supreme Court 
was faced with a contention that it should adopt the 
"partial responsibility" standard to reduce first degree 
murder to second degree murder. The court refused to 
hold it error to fail to give such an instruction. In the 
first instance, the court rejected the theory of the rule, 
but also noted that no evidence was before the court to 
show that the defendant could not form the requisite 
intent. The court held that mere testimony of ''mental 
illness'' as such was not sufficient to require submitting 
the case to the jury, since the jury should have evidence 
before them showing the "line of demarcation" beyond 
which a defendant's mental powers to intend would not 
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go. Having established such a requirement, the court 
stated: 
''There are three reasons therefore why the 
requested instruction was properly refused. * * * 
no basis in law for a distinction between the men-
tal ability to entertain deliberation and premedi-
tation, and malice aforethought has been pre-
sented. * * * such line of demarcation was not and 
has not been pointed out in the evidence adduced 
by either party." (65 P. 2d at 759) 
Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the 
Deg·ree of Crime, 56 Yale Law Journal 959 (1947), at 
page 97 4, made note of this aspect of the Van Vlack case : 
''A third reason put forth in State v. Van 
Vlack for rejecting the requested instruction was 
that there was no demarcation made in the testi-
mony between ability to entertain malice afore-
thought or deliberation and premeditation. The 
medical evidence presented on behalf of the de-
fense was that defendant did not know right from 
wrong, and suffered from a delusion and a maniac 
depressive form of insanity. There was no evi-
dence and no standard by which the jury could 
determine whether defendant had that greater 
degree of mentality required to deliberate and 
premeditate. 
''This was a point of evidence. The requested 
instruction was not supported by the evidence as 
summarized by the court. This ground ''"as enough 
to support the decision * * *.'' 
Certainly, evidence merely meeting the tests of gen-
eral insanity and evidencing some mental problem is not 
a sufficient showing to warrant the jury being· instructed 
on the partial responsibility theory. Here, there was no 
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evidence before the jury demonstrating how the appellant 
could understand the nature and consequences of his act, 
know right from wrong, and adhere to the right, yet still 
have a. total impairment of his intent to commit the act. 
In United Stales v. Storey, 9 U. S. C. M. A. 162, 25 
C. M. R. 424 (1958), the defendant was convicted of 
assaulting a military policeman in the execution of his 
duties. The evidence showed the accused entered a bar-
racks and fired his weapon at the wall. He was ordered 
to leave and did so. An air policeman approached the 
accused to apprehend him. The air policeman ordered 
the accused to drop his weapon ; instead, the accused 
advanced on the policeman and did not stop until the 
policeman had fired four warning shots. A psychiatrist 
testified that the accused was legally sane but was suf-
fering from a' 'mental disorder'' falling within the char-
acter and behavior group. He further testified that the 
accused's ability to adhere to the right was impaired and 
he believed the offenses charged were largely the result 
of the mental condition. He also stated his belief that the 
accused's ability to adhere to the right was impaired and 
degree of premeditation, intent, willfulness or malice re-
quired by the charges. The accused was convicted and 
on appeal attacked the law officer's instructions to the 
court on the question of partial responsibility. The gov-
ernment admitted the instruction was inadequate, but 
submitted the evidence did not raise the issue or require 
such an instruction and, hence, the error was not preju-
dicial. The Court of Military Appeals affirmed the con-
viction, holding the issue of partial responsibility was 
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not validly raised. The court held that the evidence must 
raise an issue of a "total" inability to intend. It stated: 
''In the instant case there is a complete absence 
of any evidence showing lack of capacity to intend, 
as distinguided from an impaired ability to intend. 
We conclude, therefore, that the issue of lack of 
mental capacity to intend was not raised and 
accordingly the law officer was under no duty to 
so instruct.'' (Emphasis added) 
The court required more than impairment, but rather 
evidence of total inability to form the required intent. 
In United States v. Qray, 9 U.S. C. M.A. 208,25 C. M. R. 
470 (1958), the Court of Military Appeals had similar 
evidence before it with a claim that an instruction was 
required. The court again held the evidence insufficient 
to warrant instruction. 
In Commonwealth v. Markle, 394 Pa. 34, 145 A. 2d 
544 (1958), the appellant, convicted of murder in the first 
degree, contended that his mind was so ''disordered'' that 
he could not have formed the specific intent. The court 
noted: 
''Markle contends that his mind was so dis-
ordered and confused that he could not have 
formed the specific intent to kill his wife. There 
is evidence indicating that appellant is emotionally 
and psychologically unstable. There is no con-
tention or evidence of insanity. While we agree 
with the contention that appellant is not a normal 
man, we cannot agree that the appellant did not 
know what he was doing and thus had no specific 
intent to kill his wife. 
"It is undisputed that immediately after the 
first shot, and again after the second shot, appel-
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lant told Leidy that he had shot and killed his 
wife. He told James Barger, a State Policeman, 
less than two hours after the killing, that he fired 
the second shot to stop his wife from screaming 
and moaning. Moreover he told Gus Zanos, the 
arresting officer, less than thirty minutes after 
the killing that he had killed his wife and that he, 
'would do it again if [he] had to.' Less than two 
hours after the killing, in response to a question 
of Constable Roy Bruner, he said it was none of 
Bruner's business why he had killed his wife. He 
also told Bruner, 'It is me [Markle] that is going 
to get the hotseat.' Finally in his written state-
ment given less than seven hours after the killing, 
he stated that he remembered getting the gun and 
shooting his wife. 
''A reading of the record indicates that John 
Markle, an emotionally unstable man, enraged by 
a slight scuffle with his wife, deliberately shot and 
intentionally killed her while fully conscious of 
his acts. 
"Markle contends that this killing could not 
rise higher than murder in the second degree be-
cause he· had a life-long history of emotional insta-
bility; he was a heavy drinker; he was discharged 
from the Army because of psychoneurosis ; he is a 
constitutional psychopath; from earliest child-
hood, he was never able to get along with his fam-
ily; he severely bumped his head during· childhood 
(as does every American boy) ; he attended twen-
ty-seven different schools in eight years and could 
not finish the eighth grade, he married a gir 1 who 
was only fourteen years old; he struck his wife 
several times ; he had great difficulty in keeping 
a job and changed jobs frequently. Assuming that 
all of this is both accurate and true, it would not be 
legally sufficient to justify a finding by the trial 
judges of second degree murder. A fortiori it is 
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not legally sufficient to warrant a finding by this 
Court of abuse of discretion, or error of law, or 
any error that would justify a reduction of the 
crime to second degree murder.'' 
The evidence in the instant case is not as compelling 
as that in Markle, which the court held would not justify 
a finding of second degree murder. If such evidence would 
not justify a finding, it would not justify an instruction 
on the issue where the evidence is less compelling. Espe-
cia.lly would an instruction be out of order where the evi-
dence was not of such definition as to allow a jury to 
meet the issues. 
The evidence in the instant case was certainly not 
couched in terms of impaired intent nor was it sufficient, 
in view of the above cases, to raise an issue as to the 
appellant's ability to intend. Finally, the only evidence 
suggestive of the issue was of a possible impaired ability 
to control impulses, not a total inability to intend. This 
evidence was based on psychological tests. In Stewart v. 
Un.ited States,. 275 F. 2d 617, 624 (D. C. Cir. 1960), the 
court that promulgated the Durham test refused to rec-
ognize partial responsibility where the evidence of 
impairment was based on psychological tests. The court 
noted: 
''The concept relies essentially on intelligence 
tests which are acknowledged by responsible psy-
chologists and psychiatrists to be guides not abso-
lutes in determining true intelligence or mental 
capacity of a human being. The results of these 
tests can vary materially depending on the edu-
cation, training and environment of the subject. 
Guttmacher and W eihofen state: 'The authors are 
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in agreement with the general view of psychia-
trists that at no time does the intelligence test, 
or any other psychological test, alone establish 
the diagnosis. They are ancillary defices of the 
greatest value, but they cannot replace sound 
clinical judgment.' Guttmacher & W eihofen, Psy-
chiatry and The Law 179 (1952)." 
It must, therefore, be concluded that even if the con-
cept were sound in the present case, the posture of the 
evidence did not warrant its application. 
D. THE DOCTRINE OF "PARTIAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY" IS NOT COMPATIBLE 
WITH PSYCHIATRIC REALITIES NOR THE 
LEGAL TESTS OF INSANITY AND SHOULD 
NOT BE APPLIED IN CASES OF THIS 
NATURE. 
The appellant as a basic premise to his contention 
argues that a mental condition short of insanity may be 
considered by the jury in determining whether an accused 
could form any specific intent required in the commission 
of the crime. It is submitted by the State that even if 
there were not evidence of rape in this instance, thus 
vitiating the need to consider the burglary claim, the law 
should not be extended to encompass such a theory. 
The appellant relies upon State v. Anselmo, 46 U. 
137, 148 P. 1071 (1915), and Sta.te v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 
P. 2d 177 (1931), to support an application of his theory 
to burglary. The Anselmo case primarily concerned itself 
with the question of intoxication and epilepsy as they 
may have inhibited the defendant in being able to pre-
meditate where the killing was committed in a hurried or 
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excitable state.3 The case does not support an extension 
to non-homicide crimes, nor does it support a claim that 
any mental condition may be weighed in considering the 
ability to specifically intend a crime where there is no 
evidence of excitable or distracting circumstances that 
would warrant concern as to whether a person could form 
the required intent. No such circumstances are apparent 
in this case. In State v. Green, supra, the question of 
mental condition as it affected the ability to reflect and 
premeditate was mentioned. The reference to the theory 
was dicta since the case was reversed, adopting the '' irre-
sistible impulse'' rule. In neither case did the court con-
cern itself with an analysis of whether such a theory 
should apply to lesser offenses, nor did it analyze the 
theory to see as it was otherwise consistent with the 
theories of mental responsibility. 
To the degree that Anselmo and Green may relate 
to the ability to premeditate during an excitable or emo-
tional situation, they are not relevant to the instant case. 
It is submitted by the State that they should not be ap-
plied beyond the above limitation, and that the theory of 
partial responsibility is not reasonably consistent with 
the test of insanity applicable in this State. 
The doctrine of partial responsibility has been 
rejected by the majority of the courts and jurisdictions 
that have considered the matter. Fisher v. United States, 
328 U. S. 463 (1946); Weihofen and Overholser, Jfental. 
Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 Yale Law 
3 It is doubtful whether present medical knowledge would support a claim 
that epilepsy would impair a premeditation in the absence of evidence of the 
killing occurring during a fugue. Davidson, Forensic Psychiatry, p. 20 ( 1952). 
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Journal959 (1947), p. 965. It is submitted that where the 
test for insanity requires that the accused know the 
nature and quality of his acts, know right from wrong 
and he able to adhere to the right, that it is ludicrous to 
say that a person could meet all these standards and yet 
be totally unable to form the required intent. Especially 
is this so in the case of using the absence of specific intent 
in burglary to reduce a case to second degree murder. In 
State v. Russell, 106 U. 116, 145 P. 2d 1003 (1944), this 
court said that in second degree murder, there need not 
be a specific intention to kill, but a premeditated design 
to cause great bodily harm or the doing of an act knowing 
that the reasonable and natural consequences thereof are 
likely to produce great bodily harm. Therefore, if appel-
lant's theory were correct, the jury could find that appel-
lant could not form the specific intent neeessary in bur-
glary, but he could form a premedidated design to cause 
great bodily harm, or know the consequences of his act 
were likely to produce such results. Such legal compart-
mentalization of the mind is a clear absurdity. In Com-
monwealth v. Heidler, 191 Pa. 375, 43 A. 211 ( 1899), the 
Pennsylvania court rejected such an absurdity, noting: 
''To e,ay that a man is insane to an extent 
which incapacitates him from fully forming an 
intent to take life, yet enables him to fully and 
maliciously form an intent to do great bodily 
harm without a purpose to take life, is absurd, 
for the one involves the same test of responsibil-
ity as the other, the ability to distinguish between 
right and wrong." 
See also State v. VanVlack, 57 Ida. 316, 65 P. 2d 736 
(1937). 
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Additionally, the theory advanced by appellant con-
templates a division of intents, both specific and general, 
not for legal classification, but a for weighing against the 
mental capacity of the accused. This is, of course, a psy-
chiatric absurdity. W eihofen and Overholser, supra, 
56 Yale L. J. at 978. Where the defendant is fully incapa-
ble of forming the "intent" to act, he obviously cannot 
adhere to the right or comprehend the nature and quality 
of his actions, and should he acquitted. Williams, Crimi-
nal La.w, 2 Ed. General Part (1961), comments on the 
practical realities of such a theory by noting: 
'' * * * Although the argument is technically sound, 
it appears, at least on the English view, to have 
small practical importance as applied to insanity. 
In practice the prosecution will nearly always 
indict ·for the graver offence; generally the 
accused, if he was insane at the time of the act, 
will have to raise the defence of insanity if he is 
to a void conviction; and the result of so doing 
will (or should) be a verdict of insanity. No ques-
tion arises therefore of convicting him of a lesser 
offence." (Section 172 at page 540.) 
The appellant contends that the Royal Commission 
on Capital Punishment (Gower Report) supported the 
adoption of such a theory by the English Parliament in 
the Homicide Act of 1957. This confuses what ·was in 
fact adopted by Parliament in the Homicide Act. It was 
a concept of "diminished responsibility" not based on a 
failure of the accused to meet the guilt or innocence tests, 
but reducing culpabilit)r because criminal justice and 
"equity" require a reduction from the maximum pun-
ishment where it would not be carried out anyway. It is 
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based on a diminished responsibility as to aU elements of 
the crime. Williams, supra, page 541, Sec. 173. This 
would require legislative action rather than a judicial 
action. Mueller, CriminaZ Law and Administration, 1960 
Annual Survey of American Law, p. 107-8. Infra page 33. 
Substantial criticism has recently been directed 
towards the feasibility and the logical basis of the limited 
responsibility tests. United States v. Stewart, supra; 43 
Cornell Law Quarterly 283 (1957). The general attack 
takes two forms: (1) That the test is adequately encom-
passed in the general instructions on insanity; and (2) 
that the psychiatric experience has not justified a dis-
tinction between being able to meet one mental standard 
and not another when both involve the same psychiatric 
realities. It is noted in 43 Cornell L. Q. 283 at page 284: 
"It is conceded by psychiatrists that the bear-
ing of a mental disorder on the crime committed is 
not something which can be determined with any 
degree of precision; the most that can be expected 
is an estimate concerning the probability of con-
nection between the crime committed and mental 
condition * * *. The psychiatrist obviously would 
serve only to confuse the jury by testifying in 
medical terms usually unintelligible to a lay 
juror.'' 
It is submitted that any extension of the partial 
responsibility tests should await a more thorough inves-
tigation, and should at least be logically consistent with 
allied legal principles and with medical science. 
Finally, two reasons of a pragmatic nature, militate 
against the acceptance of the appellant's position in 
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Utah. First, if appellant's contention were deemed cor-
rect, in the case of a specific intent crime in a felony 
murder case, the presence of mental impairment under 
appellant's theory would reduce the degree of murder 
to second degree. However, under the Green case, supra, 
if the murder were charged as occurring with premedi-
tation and not as a felony murder, the presence of 
impaired mentality may reduce the degree to man-
slaughter. This would create an inconsistency not based 
on reality. Secondly, Utah has no statutory scheme to 
''treat'' people who may be found to suffer from dimin-
ished responsibility. Such persons would be handled like 
regular prisoners which defeats much of the purpose for 
the application of the doctrine. Silving, Criminal Law 
of Mental Incapacity, 53 Jnl. of Criminal Law, Criminol-
ogy and Pol. See. 129 (1962). 
It is, therefore, submitted appellant's theory should 
he rejected. 
PorNT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING APPELLANT'S REQUESTED IN-
STRUCTION EMBODYING THE SOjCALLED 
DURHAM RULE, SINCE: 
A. THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WAS 
INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER INST'RUC-
TIONS REQUESTED BY THE APPEL-
LANT. 
B. THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT PROPER 
UNDER THE LAW OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, AND NO BASIS FOR CHANGING 
THE PRESENT RULE EXISTS. 
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C. THE LEGISLATURE ALONE MAY PRE-
SCRIBE A NEW RULE OF CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AT THIS TIME. 
* * * * * 
A. THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION WAS 
INCONSISTENT WITH OTHER INSTRUC-
TIONS REQUESTED BY THE APPELLANT. 
The trial court is under no obligation to give an 
instruction that would he inconsistent with other instruc-
tions or mislead or confuse the jury. State v. Erwin, 101 
U. 356, 120 P. 2d 285 (1942); Abbott, Criminal Trial 
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 663. The appellant in his request 
for additional instructions made a request embodying the 
M'Naghten rules with the irresistible impulse theory 
which was given in part by the court (R. 60, etc., Docu-
ment Folder) Instructions 10 and 14. 
Instruction No. 12, also requested (R. 62), embodied , 
the Durham test, which is inconsistent with M'Naghten. 
Further requested Instruction No. 13 was inconsistent 
with both theories. It does not appear from the record 
that such instructions were proposed in the alternative. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court, having 
been deluged with various theories, some inconsistent 
with the others, could properly refuse the requests on 
this basis. 
B. THE INSTRUCTION WAS NOT PROPER 
UNDER THE LAW OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH, AND NO BASIS FOR CHANGING THE 
PRESENT RULE EXISTS. 
In the case of State v. McWhinney, 43 U. 135, 134 P. 
362, this court adopted the M'Naghten rules for deter-
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mining legal responsibility in cases of claimed insanity. 
The standard set out by the judges in M'Naghten's 
Ca.se, 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng. Reprint 718 (1843), is 
simply stated: 
''To establish a defense on the ground of insan-
ity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of 
committing the act, the party accused was labor-
ing under such a defect of reason, from disease of 
the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of 
the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that 
he did not know he was doing what was wrong.'' 
In State v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P. 2d 177 (1931), this 
court added to the basic structure of the M'Naghten 
formula the so-called ''irresistible impulse'' test, which 
simply requires that in addition the accused must be able 
to adhere to the right. This has been the applied rule 
in Utah since that time. Appellant would now ask the 
court to abandon its previous test in favor of the rule 
laid down in Durha;m v. United States, 214 F. 2d 852 
(D. C. 1954), wherein the court stated: 
'' * * * an accused is not criminally responsible if 
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease 
or defect." (Emphasis added) 
It is noteworthy that the Durham court did not define 
any of the terms it used as a basis for its test. Indeed, 
the District of Columbia Circuit had some difficulty defin-
ing what was meant by the term product as used in the 
rule, Carter v. Under! Stales, 252 F. 2d 608 (1937), and 
substantial difficulty in defining what "\Yas meant by dis-
ease. Blocker v. U11ifed States,. 288 F. 2d 853 (1961). In 
Sta1te v. Kirkham, 7 U. 2d 108, 319 P. 2d 859 (1958), this 
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court took a detached look at an instruction embodying 
the right and wrong test plus the irresistible impulse rule, 
and concluded that the instruction was the proper test 
to be applied in Utah. The court was aware of the Dur-
ham rule, but even so approved the standard of Staie v. 
Green., supra, saying: 
"In our opinion, the subject instruction, ap-
proved in State v. Green, strictly from the stand-
point of what is most favorable for the accused in 
a criminal case, is one of the most liberal that can 
be found in the country. Reading it as we do, with-
out indulging fine distinctions between legal and 
medical terminology - frequently misunderstood 
or not understood by laymen - and without es-
pousing the philosophy advanced by some that the 
question of insanity should he taken from the jury 
and vested in professional people, we believe such 
instruction to be the embodiment of almost all of 
the approved instructions on the subject which 
have been sired by M'Naghten's case (the so-
called right and wrong test), State v. Pike (no 
legal resonsibility if the act is the product of men-
tal disease), People v. Schmidt (no legal responsi-
bility if the accused did not know the act was 
wrong morally), Durham v. United States (no 
legal responsibility if the act is the product of 
mental disease or mental defect), and what we be-
lieve to be the most recent case on the subject, 
State v. Collins (right and wrong test represent-
ing the great weight of authority). In these cases 
is found a wealth of authority practically exhaust-
ing the arguments that perennially are presented 
in the continuing debate among professional men 
as to what test properly should be applied in de-
termining guilt or innocence where the factor of 
mental disturbance of one degree or another is 
involved. 
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''The instruction we espouse, set out above, 
pretty much represents a reflection of both facets 
of the M'Naghten jewel, satisfied the eminent 
Mr. Justice Cardozo's eruditely expressed pref-
erences in the Schmidt case, should satisfy the 
classmates of the irresistible impulse school, and 
even should not be too offensive to the Durham 
rule advocates.'' 
'Certainly, the Kirkham case can be claimed for the 
proposition that Durham has no place in Utah. Durham 
has not found support in other jurisdictions either. Re-
cently, in Case v. State, 369 P. 2d 997 (Alaska 1962), 
the Alaska Supreme Court was urged to abandon 
M'Naghten the court noted that the Durham rule had been 
rejected in "three federal courts of appeal, the United 
States Court of Military Appeals, and the highest courts 
of twenty states.'' With this in mind, it is submitted that 
there is no basis that would warrant the State of Utah 
in adopting the Durham rule. Certainly, the Durham case 
has many defects, but the major reasons for rejecting its 
adoption were summed up in the Chase opinion, where the 
Alaska court. said : 
''We are not persuaded to adopt Durham in 
this jurisdiction. The 'disease-product' test has 
no real meaning to us, and we venture to say, 
would have none to jurors who would apply it to 
the facts nor to the judges who would frame 
inestructions. The terms 'mental disease' and 
'mental defect' are not defined, and hence they 
would mean in any particular case whatever the 
experts say they mean. A further difficuity is that 
the psychiatrists disagree on vlhat is meant by 
'mental disease,' or even if there is any such 
thing. We shall not impose upon the trial courts 
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and jurors the formidable, if not impossible task 
of understanding and applying terms whose mean-
ing is unclear to acknowledged experts. 
''We fully recognize the great difficulty in 
many cases of ascertaining the mental condition 
of an accused and of assessing its effect on his 
conduct at the time of the commission of the crim-
inal act. It is difficult because the criterion of re-
sponsibility cannot be defined with complete scien-
tific precision; psychiatric evidence is technical 
and complex, and diametrically opposed views will 
frequently be expressed by expert witnesses. Be-
cause of these factors we consider it important 
that the jury, which must make the final decision 
as to criminal accountability, should be given as 
far as possible clear and simple principles on 
which to base their verdict. Such is not accom-
plished by the Durham rule.'' 
Although Durham received much comment and 
acclaim upon promulgation, the operation of the rule in 
practice and subsequent reflection of the premises upon 
which it is based have led many authorities, apart from 
the courts, to renounce its doctrine. Cavanagh, A Psy-
chiatrist Looks at the Durham Decision, 5 Catholic U. L. 
Rev. 25 (1955); 116 Am. J. of Psychiatry 295 (1959) ; 
Mueller, Criminal Law and Procedure, 1959 Annual Sur-
vey of American Law 111, 112-113. Further, one of the 
strongest blows of all against the Durham rule came in 
Blocker v. United States, 288 F. 2d 853 (D. C. Cir. 1961), 
wherein Justice Burger of the Court of Appeals of the 
District of Columbia called for abandonment of the Dur-
ham rule.4 Judge Burger found two principal defects in 
4 Congress may well concur since H. R. 7052, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1961, 
proposed the adoption of the A. L. I. test rather than continue under Durham. 
See also H. R. Rep. 563, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1961). 
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the rule: (1) That the definition of "disease" was inade-
quate; 5 and (2) that the concept of "product" was with-
out significant meaning. 
Pro ha hly the most telling argument against its 
adoption comes by virtue of the judges of the many courts 
who have rejected the test. In State v. Collins, 50 Wash. 
2d 740, 314 P. 2d 660 (1957), the Washington court con-
cluded that they should: 
'' [be] concerned * * * not only with what psychia-
trists and writers for legal periodicals believe the 
test should he, but with what trial judges * * * 
believe would be the effect of any change.'' 
Washington most recently reaffirmed the M'Naghten 
rule, Sta.te v. White, 374 P. 2d 942 (Wash. 1962). 
Certainly, therefore, the weight of authority, as well 
as reason, rejects adoption of Durham. It ,,~as stated by 
Mueller & Pie ski, Criminal Law and Administration, 1961, 
Annual Survey of American Law, 107, at 113, in comment-
ing on a statutory adoption of Durham in Maine : 
"The good people of Maine may not know it, 
but they bought last decade's fashionable ward-
robe. Really modern judges, legal scholars and 
advanced psychiatry have long shed Durham's ill-
fitting toga and returned to fitting and sensible 
patterns.'' 
Appellant has further called to the court's attention 
the recent American Law· Institute proposal in the Model 
5 For a most compelling case in argument for the conclusion that mental 
disease means only what the psychiatrist says it does, see In re Rosenfield, 157 
F. Supp. 18 (1957). 
32 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Penal Code. It suffices for this case to note that the test 
was not passed on by the trial court. K evosek v. State, 8 
Wise. 2d 640, 100 N.W. 2d 339 (1961). However, many of 
the ambiguities of the Durham test are equally apparent 
in the Model Penal Code, W eihofen The Urge to Punish 
( 1956), p. 63-98, and more courts are declaring the ques-
tion of the adoption of the Model Penal Code rule to be 
one of legislative discretion and not for the courts. People 
v. Johnson, 13 Misc. 2d 376, 169 N.Y.S. 2d 217 (1962). 
Until such time as the knowledge of mental problems 
reaches a point where it can be shown that the rule in 
Green and Kirk harm should be replaced, these cases 
should still control. People v. DeFr·arncesco, 20 Misc. 2d 
854, 193 N.Y. S. 2d 963 (S. Ct. 1959). The most compel-
ling argument, it is submitted, for continuing the pres-
ent Utah standard is that the ultimate judgment is not 
medical but moral, and the present tests adequately bal-
ance both aspects. 6 
C. THE LEGISLATURE ALONE MAY 
PRESCRIBE A NEW RULE OF CRIMINAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AT THIS TIME. 
It is submitted by the State that this court is, at 
the present time, interdicted by statute from accepting 
the Durham rule or any other test recently promulgated. 
Section 68-3-1, U. C. A. 1953, provides: 
"The common law of England so far as it is 
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States, or the Consti-
tution or laws of this State, and so far only as it is 
6 Silving, supra, 53 Jnl. Criminal Law, Criminology and Pol. Sci. 
129 ( 1962). 
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consistent with and adapted to the natural and 
physical conditions of this state and the necessi-
ties of the people hereof, is hereby adopted, and 
shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this 
state.'' 
The rule of common law that would be applicable 
under this statute would be the common law as it was 
generally conceded to be at the time of the adoption of 
the above statute. R. S. 1898, Sec. 2488 ; Hatch v. Hatch, 
46 U. 116, 121, 148 P. 1096. As a consequence, the gen-
eral M'Naghten rules would be applicable to Utah 
unless they were inconsistent with the "necessities of 
the people" of Utah. It is not now a question of con-
cern whether the court met this issue in State v. Green, 
supra, when it adopted the irresistible impulse test; 
however, this statute is presently applicable to the 
criminal law of the state. Oleson v. Pincock, 65 U. 507, 
251 P. 23; State v. Johnson, 44 U. 18, 137 P. 632; State v. 
De(JJJ!l,, 69 U. 260, 254 P. 142. This court would only be 
justified in abandoning the M'Naghten plus the irre-
sistible impulse rule if it could he shown that they were 
improper because of changed conditions, or unsuitable 
as being too "harsh" or rigorous. Hatch v. Ha.tch. 
supra. It is submitted that no such finding is possible. 
This court rejected as much of a suggestion in the Kirk-
ham case, supra. Certainly, the moral judgment implicit 
in the present Utah test can hardly he said to have been 
rejected by the times, nor can it be said to be inappli-
c.able to the needs of the citizenry. For this reason, it is 
submitted that, for the present time, any change in the 
standard of criminal responsibility should await legis-
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lative action. People v. Johnson, 13 Misc. 2d 376, 169 
N. Y. S. 2d 217 (1962).7 
PoiNT III 
THE APPELLANT HAS NO BASIS UPON 
WHICH TO CLAIM ERROR FROM THE SUM-
MATION ARGUMENT OF THE TRIAL 
PROSECUTOR. 
The appellant contends that the actions of the prose-
cutor for the State, in making his summation, were prej-
udicial to his rights. It is submitted that this contention 
is wholly without merit. The import of the appellant's 
contention is twofold. It is contended, first, that there 
was placed before the jury a personal belief of the ac-
cused's guilt and, second, that the ''personal'' refer-
ences of the prosecutor were of such a nature as to incite 
the passions and prejudices of the jurors. 
The first contention is based on the statement 
appearing on page 451 of the record, set out on page 
28 of appellant's brief. The essence of the statement is 
that all of the public officials associated with prosecu-
tion and investigation of the crime had no doubt that 
they "were trying the right man." This reference in 
no way takes from the jury the sole issue before it of 
the accused's mental responsibility. It is merely a clear 
statement of fact that there is no doubt that the appel-
lant committed the killing. The statement of the prose-
cutor was no more than the same statement made by 
7 It might also be noted that even were this court to adopt a different 
>tandard of insanity, it could avail the appellant nothing, since the evidence 
supports exculpation under neither Durham or the A.L.I. standards. 
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the defense counsel to the jury during opening argument 
(R. 287): 
''There is no question, ladies and gentlemen, 
that the tragic and unfortunate thing has oc-
curred, occurred over in American Fork on or 
about the 17th of September. I don't think there 
is any question but what Darrell Devere Poulson, 
the defendant in this action, was a cause of this 
unfortunate and tragic occurrence.'' 
Additionally, defense counsel stated on closing 
argument that, "The crime was a terrible thing." (R. 
459) The crime was a terrible thing and it is absurd to 
say that when a prosecutor merely comments to the jury 
that the accused is the person responsible for the crime, 
a fact admitted during the course of the trial by both 
sides, there has been any forensic error committed. The 
facts of this case in this respect are not different from 
those in State v. Jameson, 103 U. 129, 134 P. 2d 173 
( 1943), where the court found a similar argument uno b-
jectionable. A prosecuting attorney has reasonable lati-
tude in commenting to the jury on what is in fact a mat-
ter of uncontradicted evidence. Abbott, Criminal Trial 
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 651. There can, therefore, be no 
serious claim of error on this point. 
The second contention, that the prosecutor's com-
ments, relating to the fact that he was familiar with 
the incident and area where the crime occurred, were 
error, is equally without merit. This statement must be 
placed in the context in which it was given. A clear read-
ing of the statement on page 452-3 of the record in no 
way shows that because of these references, he was ask-
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ing the jury to take any action against the defendant. It 
clearly appears that he was calling to the jury's atten-
tion the fact that his argument may be biased by the 
fact that he was so close to the case. The statement was 
obviously made in complete candor in order to have the 
jury weigh the facts which he was then about to dis-
close. The statement, far from being legally objection-
able, is to be commended, for it is well that a prosecu-
tor call to the attention of the jury circumstances in his 
background that may affect the weight of his argument. 
It is unfortunate that appellant has sought to twist this 
commendable action into a claim for prejudice when, in 
fact, it benefitted rather than injured his position. 
The appellant contends that a portion of the prose-
cutor's argument, to the degree that it refers to the hor-
rible nature of the crime and the damage committed by 
the appellant, is inflammatory. It should be remembered 
that this case was a capital case in which, under Utah 
procedure, the jury determines whether or not the 
defendent must be put to death. It, therefore, is fully 
proper for a prosecutor to weigh for the jury all the 
community and social aspects of the crime, for these are 
matters very much a part of the question of whether 
the defendant should pay with his life.8 The reference 
in this instance was to the sorrow caused the relatives 
and family of the victim. In State v. Zakoura., 145 Kan. 
204, 68 P. 2d 11, 16 (1937), the Kansas Supreme Court 
considered a similar claim of error in a murder case 
where the prosecutor stated: 
8 No more liberal person than Emmanuel Kant, the great German philoso-
pher, espoused the same reasoning as a basis for criminal punishment. 
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''* * * 'Gentlemen of the jury, as you go to the 
jury room, think of that little grave down here in 
the cemetery. * * * Let's not forget the sorrow-
ing sisters -let's not forget the sorrowing rela-
tives of the deceased.' '' 
The Kansas court found the statement to be far from 
prejudicial, noting that it must be clearly shown that 
the statement was likely to prejudice the jury. At the 
worst, it can be said the statement of the prosecutor was 
an appeal to the sympathy of the jury, but this is not 
a basis to claim error; for, a prosecutor, like a defense 
counsel, may comment on all matters affected by the 
crime, and sympathy for the deceased and those injured 
by the crime is one of them. Abbott, supra, Sec. 655. 
Certainly, in a capital case, the jury has a right to hear 
from both sides on the merits of inflicting the death pen-
alty and not merely be limited to receiving bland plati-
tudes of mercy from the defendant. 
The appellant contends that the comments of the 
prosecutor were in fact personal references to a belief 
of guilt or innocence. Such, they were not. They were 
merely a deduction of fact from all the evidence and, 
therefore, not objectionable. The general rule recog-
nized in this area is stated in Wharton's Criminal Law 
arnd Procedure, Vol. 5, p. 246: 
'' * * * It is generally held, accordingly, subject 
to certain exceptions, that statements by the pros-
ecutor, in argument, indicative of his opinion, he-
lief, or knowledge as to the guilt of the accused, 
when made as a deduction or conclusion from the 
evidence introduced in the trial, are permissible 
and unobjectionable.'' 
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This court has recognized the general rule to that 
effect in State v. M(J)rtinez, 56 U. 351, 191 P. 314 (1920), 
also a murder trial. There the court said : 
''Defendant also excepts to a statement made 
in the argument to the jury by one of the state's 
counsel who tried the- case to the effect that 'this 
man (meaning the defendant) committed one of 
the gravest crimes ever committed in the state of 
Utah.' This was simply a statement of counsel's 
opinion made in the- course of argument. Counsel 
had the right to state his conclusions from the evi-
dence even though his conclusions were wrong. 
There was no error in this regard.'' 
See also State v. Spencer, 15 U. 149, 49 P. 302 (1897), 
fora case of much more severe comment, wherein this 
court refused to reverse. See also cases collected in 50 
A.L.R. 2d 766. 
Certainly, the prosecutor made no such objection-
able statement as that made by defense counsel, which 
is directly contrary to the Canons of Ethics of the Amer-
ican Bar Association, Canon 15, when he stated (R. 470), 
''I am firmly convinced, myself, of the insanity of this 
boy." 
Finally, the appellant certainly cannot complain 
where he failed to take exeeption or render an ohjeetion 
to the argument. State v. Romero, 12 U. 2d 210, 364 P. 
2d 828 ( 1961). The- general rule is noted in Warren, 
Homicide, Vol. 4, p. 366 : 
''As a general rule, improper conduct, argu-
ment, or statements by the prosecuting attorney at 
a trial for homicide will not, in the absence of ob-
jection or exception at the trial, be available on 
appeal or error.'' 
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See also Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Sec. 
2079; Abbott, Criminal TriaJ Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 649; 
People v. Hardenbrook, 48 Cal. 2d 345, 309 P. 2d 424; 
Stale v. Spears, 76 Wyo. 82, 300 P. 2d 551. Indeed, the 
strongest reason in favor of concluding that no prejudice 
occurred to the appellant from the prosecutor's argu-
ment was the failure of experienced and capable coun-
sel to object, move to strike, move for mistrial, or ask 
for limiting instructions. This obviously leads to the 
belief that the prosecutor's argument was thought to be 
innocuous by defense counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has been accorded a full and fair trial ; 
the issues raised on appeal afford no basis for relief; 
nor do they raise matters of such a nature as would 
'warrant this court in ordering a retrial. The appellant 
has committed a horrible and bestial crime, but the 
processes of the law have been steadfastly accorded 
him. Having received his days in court, having been 
found guilty by a fair and impartial jury of citizens, 
and no error having been committed that would warrant 
reversal, this court should affirm and the appellant pay 
for his crime with his life. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT !\:ESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Deputy Attorney General 
.Attorneys for Respondent 
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